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Abstract. Simulation-based security notions for cryptographic proto-
cols are regarded as highly desirable, primarily because they admit strong
composability and, consequently, a modular design. In this paper, we give
a simulation-based security definition for two-round authenticated mes-
sage exchange and show that a concrete protocol, 2AMEX-1, satisfies
our security property, that is, we provide an ideal functionality for two-
round authenticated message exchange and show that 2AMEX-1 realizes
it securely. To model the involved public-key infrastructure adequately,
we use a joint-state approach.
1 Introduction
Simulation-based security definitions for cryptographic protocols,
see, for instance, [Can01,PW01,BPW04,Küs06], are attracting much
attention, the reasons being that such security definitions “guaran-
tee security even when a secure protocol [. . . ] is used as a compo-
nent of an arbitrary system” [Can01] and that they enable “modular
proofs of security” [PW01]. As a consequence, a variety of crypto-
graphic primitives such as asymmetric encryption and digital sig-
natures have been treated following the simulation-based approach.
There are, however, only few complex cryptographic protocols that
have been tackled within the simulation-based framework. We are
aware of [CK02,MN06,BCJ+06,BP06,GMP+08], where, for instance,
Kerberos and the Yahalom protocol are treated.
In this paper, we deal with two-round authenticated message
exchange protocols following the simulation-based approach. We
(i) provide an ideal functionality for two-round authenticated mes-
sage exchange protocols, F2AM, (ii) provide an implementation,
P2AMEX−1, corresponding to a particular such protocol, 2AMEX-1,
and (iii) prove the implementation of 2AMEX-1 to be secure, that
is, prove that P2AMEX−1 securely realizes the ideal functionality, in
symbols P2AMEX−1 ≤BB F2AM. (The superscript stands for black-box
simulatability.)
The protocol 2AMEX-1, see [KSW09], which is a generic proto-
col for message authentication in a web service setting, is complex
in several respects: it distinguishes between short-lived clients and
long-lived servers; it uses digital signatures and therefore makes use
of a public-key infrastructure; it requires only bounded memory; it
uses nonces and timestamps to counter replay attacks; each client
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and each server has its own local clock. In [KSW09], 2AMEX-1 was
proved to be secure in the Bellare-Rogaway framework as presented
in [BR93].
Several simulation-based approaches have been developed over
the last decade (see above). We could have used any of these ap-
proaches, but we have adopted the one by Küsters, see [Küs06],
because it provides a very flexible addressing mechanism and easy-
to-use joint-state theorems, see [KT08a]. The latter is especially use-
ful in the analysis of 2AMEX-1, because it allows us to show with
only little effort that 2AMEX-1 works securely with a simple, but
realistic public-key infrastructure. Although Küsters’ setting comes
in handy in many respects, it also has some shortcomings, which
become evident from our analysis and are discussed in this paper.
We start with the sketch of Küsters’ model in Section 2, go on
with a description of the setting and the ideal functionalities in Sec-
tion 3 and a description of the implementation for 2AMEX-1 in
Section 4, and conclude with our main result and a discussion in
Sections 5 and 6.
We are grateful to Max Tuengerthal for helpful comments.
2 Simulation-Based Security
In this section, we give a high-level description of the simulation-
based framework from [Küs06], which is referred to as the IITM
framework, where IITM stands for inexhaustible interactive Turing
machine.
In the IITM framework cryptographic protocols and the environ-
ment they are run in (including the adversary) are modeled as con-
current, polynomial-time, probabilistic, interactive, replicable Tur-
ing machines. Here, “concurrent” refers to an interleaving semantics,
that is, only one IITM is active at a time and there is a mechanism
that determines which IITM is activated next; “replicable” refers to
a mechanism which allows certain machines, the so-called banged
machines, to be instantiated several times (and run concurrently);
“interactive” means that the machines can communicate by sharing
tapes, more precisely: an output tape of one machine can be the
input tape of another machine. From a security point of view, it is
important that systems of IITM’s can be simulated in polynomial
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time. To achieve this, it is, however, not enough to require that the
individual IITM’s are polynomial-time, because two IITM’s “playing
ping pong” could double their outputs on each activation, leading
to an overall exponential running time. For that reason the IITM
framework imposes certain restrictions on how machines are inter-
connected, based on a partition of tapes into consuming and enrich-
ing. Roughly speaking, the overall length of the output of one IITM
up to a certain point may be polynomial in the overall length of the
input on enriching tapes up to the same point, but there must not
be any cycle of enriching tapes. This is less restrictive than requiring
that each IITM runs in time polynomial in the security parameter;
it allows to process inputs of arbitrary size.
To illustrate the IITM framework consider Figure 1 and first
focus on the box labeled F2AM. This box represents a model of two-
round authenticated message exchange protocols (details follow in
the next section); it contains four machines which represent an actual
protocol: C, S, EI, and NG, of which the first three are banged (can
be replicated), and the last one is not. Every instance of machine C is
connected with machine NG, in both directions. The corresponding
input tape of NG is enriching, while the input tape of C is not.
There are two types of connections crossing the borders of F2AM:
solid connections representing tapes classified as I/O tapes and dashed
connections representing tapes classified as network tapes. I/O tapes
should roughly be thought of as tapes communicating with “users”
of the system, whereas network tapes are tapes where the adversary
can interfere.
In Figure 1, the adversary, represented by an IITM denoted A,
is not connected directly with F2AM. Rather, there is a mediator be-
tween A and F2AM, namely an IITM S called simulator. The situa-
tion is typical for simulation-based security: a simulator “translates”
network traffic to make a system (in this case F2AM) seem equivalent
to another one (usually a “real” system P , see below) to an outside
observer consisting of an environment machine E (taking over the
role of all users) and an adversary A.
Another feature of Figure 1 not discussed yet has to do with how
different instances of the same machine are addressed. Underlining
the name of a machine indicates the usage of a generic addressing





























Fig. 1. Ideal functionality for two-round message authentication
prefixes of messages as identifiers for instances. In Figure 1 the ma-
chine EI is underlined twice, which adds two prefixes for addressing,
that is, a hierarchical addressing mechanism is used. We use it to
model multi-user multi-session instances.
The formal way to specify the system represented by the box
F2AM in Figure 1 is by the expression
F2AM =!FC | !FS | FNG | !FEI , (1)
where FC, FS, FNG, and FEI denote (descriptions of) the underlying
IITM’s, and | denotes an operator for composing machines.
In the IITM framework, security of a protocol is defined as fol-
lows. First, one describes a system of IITM’s, F , which works in an
ideal fashion in every setting where an environment and an adversary
are connected to it, that is, how one would expect a perfect protocol
to work. Such a system is called an ideal functionality. Then, given
a real protocol, one describes a system of IITM’s, P , which works
just the way the real protocol would work in every setting where
an environment and an adversary are connected to it. Now, P is
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considered secure if there is a simulator IITM S with the follow-
ing property. For every environment machine E and every adversary
machine A, the system composed of P , E , and A is computationally
indistinguishable from the system composed of F , E , A, and S. As
explained above communication between these machines is restricted
as follows: all external network connections of F are handled by the
simulator S; the adversary may only communicate with F using the
network interface provided by the simulator; and the environment
may only communicate with F using I/O connections. Hence, the
system composed of F and the simulator (translating network mes-
sages) is “equivalent” to P . In other words, every attack on the real
protocol can be transferred into the ideal system.
If the above condition is satisfied, then P securely realizes (or
implements) F , denoted by P ≤BB F (for black-box simulation).
3 Two-Round Authenticated Message
Exchange
We start with a description of the general scenario. In a session of
a two-round authenticated message exchange protocol (2AM pro-
tocol) a client sends a request to a server and expects to receive
an appropriate response. This is, for instance, the case for web ser-
vice calls, see, e. g., [ML07,LB07] and remote procedure calls, see,
e. g. [Sun98,Win99]. Observe that for these protocols to make sense
the request and response messages include payloads.
In a 2AM protocol the request and the response messages are
required to be secured in such a way that (i) both client and server
can verify that the messages they receive are authentic, (ii) the server
accepts no message twice (payloads, on the contrary, may be received
twice, but only in different messages), and (iii) if the client receives
a response, it can be sure which of his requests the response refers
to. Note that the same client may have multiple sessions with the
same or different servers in parallel, but each session has only two
rounds.
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3.1 Overview of the Ideal Functionality
Our model of the ideal functionality for 2AM protocols consists of
four functionalities, see Figure 1: a client FC (defined in Figure 2),
a server FS (defined in Figure 3), a nonce generator FNG (defined in
Appendix B.4), and an enriching input functionality FEI (defined in
Appendix B.5). The ideal functionality F2AM is the composition of
these functionalities, as defined in (1).
One instance of the client functionality handles exactly one ses-
sion between a client identity and a server, i. e., after initialization it
basically (i) receives a request from the environment and encapsu-
lates it in a message to a server, and (ii) receives a response from the
server and forwards its contents to the environment. One instance of
the server functionality also handles exactly one session; as with the
client, it consists of receiving a request and sending a response. The
nonce generator generates globally unique session identifiers (num-
bers used once, nonces) to distinguish multiple sessions between two
parties. The enriching input functionality passes bits from an enrich-
ing input tape to the adversary. These bits are necessary to give the
adversary additional capabilities as explained in Section 4.3.
3.2 Ideal Client Functionality
When the environment wants to start a new session, it provides
the client with the identity of a server the client is supposed to
communicate with. The client then responds with a nonce, which can
be viewed as a handle, i. e., it allows the environment to distinguish
different sessions this client is involved in.
The environment can now pass the payload of the request mes-
sage to the client as well as enough resources to process a possible
response from the server. The client then notifies the adversary that
a message is ready to be sent. If the adversary (ever) allows the
transfer, the message is written to the incoming tape of the server.
This models the adversary’s ability to delay or drop messages on the
network.
When the server transfers a response (which is not too large),
the client simply unwraps it and forwards the contents to the envi-
ronment. The details are spelled out in Figure 2.
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Tapes: C←←→ EC, C L999K ÂC, C←→ S, C←→→ NG
Initialization: c = s = r = ε, n = 0, state = Init, cor = false
Steps: loop
Send a request to the server:
if (c′, (Client, s′), Init) received from EC
Let state = OK, c = c′ and s = s′.
Send (c, (Client, s),GetNonce) to NG.
Recv (c, (Client, s),Nonce, r′) from NG, let r = r′.
Send (c, (Client, s, r),Nonce, r) to EC.
Recv (c, (Client, s, r),Request, pc, 1n
′
) from EC, let n = n
′.
Send (c, (Client, s, r),Request, pc, n) to ÂC.
Recv (c, (Client, s, r),Request, Send) from ÂC.
Send (c, (Client, s, r),Request, pc) to S.
Receive and process a response from the server:
if (s, (Server, c, r),Response, ps) received from S
If state 6= OK or |ps| > n, abort.
Let state = Stopped.
Send (c, (Client, s, r),Response, ps) to EC.
Corruption: Corr(cor , true, state 6= Init, ε, ÂC, {EC}, EC)
CheckAddress: Accept the initialization message only once. Check for c, s, and r as soon
as each one has been set.
Fig. 2. The client functionality FC
A special mode of computation of IITM’s, CheckAddress, is used
in the last line of IITM definitions like Figure 2 to determine whether
an incoming message is addressed to the current instance of the
client IITM. If a message is rejected by all running instances, a new
instance of the client IITM is started since the client IITM is banged
in F2AM. In addition, we use the corruption macro Corr from [KT08a]
(with a slightly extended addressing mechanism) to allow a uniform
treatment of corruption of clients and servers in both the ideal and
the real world, see Appendix B.3.
3.3 Ideal Server Functionality
To start a session on the server side, the environment sends a message
to the server with the identity it is supposed to receive messages for
and the maximal length of an incoming request message.
Upon receiving a request from a client, the server unwraps it
and forwards the request payload to the environment. Now the en-
vironment can respond by passing a response payload to the server
functionality. The server asks the adversary, who has three options:
It can either approve the sending of the payload, in which case the
server delivers the message directly to the client. Secondly, the ad-
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Tapes: S←←→ ES, S L999K ÂS, S←→ C
Initialization: s = c = r = ps = ε, n = 0, state = Init0, cor = false
Steps: loop
Initialization by the environment:
if (s′, (Server), Init, 1n
′
) received from ES
If state 6= Init0, abort. Let s = s′ and n = n′.
Send (s, (Server), Init, n) to ÂS.
Recv (s, (Server), Init,OK) from ÂS.
Let state = Init1.
Receive and process a request from the client:
if (c′, (Client, s, r′),Request, pc) received from C
If state 6= Init1 or |pc| > n, abort. Let state = OK, c = c′, and r = r′.
Send (s, (Server, c, r),Request, pc) to ES.
Receive a response payload from the environment:
if (s, (Server, c, r),Response, p) received from ES
Let ps = p. Send (s, (Server, c, r),Response, ps) to ÂS.
Deliver a response to the client:
if (s, (Server, c, r),Response, Send) received from ÂS and not cor
If state 6= OK, abort. Let state = Stopped.
Send (s, (Server, c, r),Response, ps) to C.
Send an error message to the environment:
if (s, (Server, c, r),Response,Error) received from ÂS
Send (s, (Server, c, r),Response,Error) to ES.
Corruption: Corr(cor , true, state 6= Init0, ε, ÂS, {ES}, ES, s)
CheckAddress: Accept the initialization message only once. Check for s, c, and r as soon
as each one has been set.
Fig. 3. The server functionality FS
versary can ignore the response, in which case the server sends no
message at all. Thirdly, the adversary can also explicitly deny pro-
cessing the payload, which results in an error message being sent to
the environment.
The first two options again model that the adversary may inter-
cept and delay network traffic. The third type of reaction models
that in our implementation the server may reject messages due to
bounded memory and notify the environment of the rejection.
4 Implementation of the 2AMEX-1 Protocol
In this section, we describe a system of IITM’s implementing the
2AMEX-1 protocol, which is a 2AM protocol in the above sense and
described in detail in [KSW09]. First, we give an informal introduc-
tion into the protocol.
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4.1 The Protocol 2AMEX-1
In 2AMEX-1, an authenticated message exchange between a client
with identity c and a server with identity s works roughly as follows.
1. a) c is asked by the environment to send the request pc
b) c sends {(From : c, To : s, MsgID : r, Time : t, Body : pc)}skc to s
c) s checks whether the message is admissible and if not, stops
d) s forwards the request (r, pc) to the environment
2. a) s receives a response (r, ps) from the environment
b) s checks whether the response is admissible and if not, stops
c) s sends {(From : s, To : c, Ref : r, Body : ps)}sks to c
d) c checks whether the message is admissible and if not, stops
e) c forwards the response ps to the environment
Here, r is the nonce as described in the previous section, which is
also used as a handle by the server (see steps 1. d) and 2. a)), t is the
value of a local clock of the client, pc is the payload the client sends,
ps is the payload the server returns, and {·}skc and {·}sks stand for
signing the message by the client and server, respectively. Repeating
the message id of the request allows the client to verify that ps is
indeed a response to the request pc.
The interesting parts are steps 1. c) and 2. b). We assume that
there is a constant caps > 0, the so-called capacity of the server, and
a constant tol+s that indicates its tolerance with respect to inaccurate
clocks. At all times the server keeps a time tmins and a finite list L of
triples (t, r, c) of pending and handled requests. At the beginning or
after a reset, tmin is set to ts+tol
+
s , where ts is a timestamp retrieved
from the local clock functionality, and L is set to the empty list.
Step 1. c). Upon receiving a message as above, the server s rejects
if t /∈
[




or if (t′, r, c′) ∈ L for some t′ and c′, and
otherwise proceeds as follows: If L contains less than caps elements,
it inserts (t, r, c) into L. Otherwise, the server deletes all tuples con-
taining the oldest timestamp from L, until L contains less than caps
tuples. Then it sets tmins to the timestamp contained in the last tuple
deleted from L, and finally inserts (t, r, c) into L.
Step 2. b). When asked to send a payload ps with message handle
r, the server rejects if there is no triple (t, r, c) ∈ L with c 6= ε.





















Fig. 4. Overview of 2AMEX-1 protocol implementation
tuple (t, r, c) to ensure that the service cannot respond to the same
message twice.
4.2 Implementation in the IITM Model
We will now describe the system of IITM’s defined by
P2AMEX−1 = !PC | !PS | !FSig | !PSI | !FKS | !FLC (2)
and illustrated in Figure 4, which implements the 2AMEX-1 proto-
col.
In (2), PC is the client-side part of the protocol (defined in Fig-
ure 5), PS is the server-side part of the protocol (defined in Ap-
pendix B.6), FSig is the signature functionality as defined in [KT08b],
PSI is an interface which allows the adversary to access the signa-
ture functionality with few restrictions (defined in Appendix B.7),
FKS is an ideal functionality of a trusted key store (defined in Ap-
pendix B.8), and FLC (defined in Appendix B.9) models a local clock
which is controlled by the adversary, i. e. not synchronized with the
clocks of other parties and not even monotone.
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4.3 Signatures and the Public Key Infrastructure
We model the digital signatures that 2AMEX-1 uses by the ideal
functionality FSig from [KT08b], which was proved to be securely
implementable using any existentially unforgeable signature scheme.
We give the adversary access to the signature scheme and al-
low him to sign any bit string that does not have the format of a
2AMEX-1 message. This models that our protocol does not have ex-
clusive access to the keys used to sign the messages. For example, the
same key can be used to sign a 2AMEX-1 message and parts of the
payload contained in that message. This is realized by the signature
interface functionality PSI, which accepts requests from the adver-
sary to (i) sign messages that do not have the format of 2AMEX-1
messages and (ii) verify arbitrary signatures. In P2AMEX−1, the signa-
ture interface functionality is banged in the multi-user multi-session
version, effectively meaning that the adversary has access to all keys
used in the protocol.
As the signature interface needs resources from the environment
to sign messages for the adversary, it has an enriching input tape
EEI. Its counterpart in the ideal system is a tape in the enriching
input functionality EI.
To coordinate how different IITM’s access a single instance of
the signature functionality, we define the ideal functionality of a key
store, FKS, which allows clients, servers, and the signature interface
functionality to retrieve trusted keys as well as the corruption sta-
tus of that key. To be able to distribute the public key, FKS also
initializes the instances of the signature functionality. The particu-
lar form of this functionality is due to the fact that we want to use
FSig from [KT08b] as is. Nevertheless, one can implement FKS us-
ing standard techniques for building a public key infrastructure: In
an implementation, the key store could be a local subroutine which,
(i) locally stores and manages a single public/private key pair, and,
(ii) when requested to retrieve the public key of another party, fetches
that key from a key server and locally checks its validity by using a
trust model, e. g., a pre-defined set of certification authorities.
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Tapes: C←←→ EC, C L999K AC, C←→→ KS, C←→→ LC, Csig ←→→ Sig, Cver ←→→ Sig
Initialization: c = s = r = ε, n = 0, state = Init, cor = false
Steps: loop
Send a request to the server:
if (c′, (Client, s′), Init) received from EC
If state 6= Init, abort. Let c = c′ and s = s′.
Generate an η-bit nonce r randomly, where η is the security parameter.
Send (c, (Client, s, r),Nonce, r) to EC.
Recv (c, (Client, s, r),Request, pc, 1n
′
) from EC, let n = n
′.
Send (c, (Client, s, r),GetKey) to KS.
Recv (c, (Client, s, r),PublicKey, kc) from KS.
Send (c, (Client, s, r),GetTime) to LC.
Recv (c, (Client, s, r),Time, t) from LC.
Send (c, (Client, s, r),Corrupted?) to KS.
Recv (c, (Client, s, r),Corrupted, cor ′) from KS. If cor ′, abort.
Let mc = (From : c,To : s,MsgID : r,Time : t,Body : pc).
Send (c, (Client, s, r), Sign,mc) on Csig.
Recv (c, (Client, s, r), Signature, σc) on Csig. Let state = OK.
Send (mc, σc) to AC.
Receive and process a response from the server:
if (ms, σs) received from AC with ms = (From : c,To : s,Ref : r,Body : ps)
If state 6= OK or cor or |ps| > n, abort.
Let n = n− |ps|.
Send (s, (Server, c, r),GetKey) to KS.
Recv (s, (Server, c, r),PublicKey, ks) from KS.
Send (s, (Server, c, r),Client, Init) on Cver.
Recv (s, (Server, c, r),Client, Init) on Cver.
Send (s, (Server, c, r),Client,Corrupted?) to KS.
Recv (s, (Server, c, r),Client,Corrupted, cor ′) from KS. If cor ′, abort.
Send (s, (Server, c, r),Client,Verify,ms, σs, ks) on Cver.
Recv (s, (Server, c, r),Client,Verified, b) from on Cver, if b 6= 1, stop.
Let state = Stopped and send (c, (Client, s, r),Response, ps) to EC.
Corruption: Corr(cor , true, state 6= Init, ε, AC, {EC}, EC, c, (Client, s, r))
CheckAddress: Check for c, s, and r as soon as each one has been set.
Fig. 5. The client protocol PC
4.4 Client Implementation
The client protocol PC (see Figure 5) is a direct implementation of
the ideal functionality FC with the following changes:
– The messages are transferred over the network (rather than ex-
changed directly between client and server). This is modeled by
writing the messages on an external network tape.
– To secure the request message, the client signs it using a digital
signature obtained from an instance of FSig for this session. The
server will be able to obtain the public key from the according
key store and verify the signature.
– When receiving a response from the server, the signature of that
message is verified by the client in the same way.
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– The nonces are not generated by a centralized entity, but ran-
domly chosen locally by each client. While this does not guar-
antee that the numbers are unique, the probability of a collision
is negligible if the length of the nonces grows linearly with the
security parameter.
– The request message is additionally secured by a timestamp. The
client uses the local clock functionality FLC to obtain a times-
tamp.
– Before using a signature functionality to sign or verify a message,
the client checks if the signature or the verification functionality
is corrupted. If either one is, the client aborts.
4.5 Server Implementation
The implementation PS of the server functionality (see Appendix B.6)
is more complicated than the client. To be able to counteract replay
attacks, one single IITM handles all sessions. That is, for each iden-
tity s all communication of that identity in the server role is handled
by one single instance of PS.
Therefore, the server maintains two lists: R stores resources passed
by the environment (corresponding to the fact that in the ideal sys-
tem, each session of the server is started by the environment), while
L (corresponding to L described in Section 4.1) is used to store infor-
mation from request messages received so far by this server. During
initialization, i. e., when receiving the first message, the server asks
the adversary to provide values for two parameters of the 2AMEX-1
protocol, namely the capacity caps and the tolerance tol
+
s .
When receiving a message from the client, the server (i) tries
to retrieve the client’s key, (ii) obtains the current time from FLC
(and checks for monotonicity of the clock), (iii) verifies the signa-
ture, (iv) checks if a message with the same nonce has already been
accepted (i. e. the nonce is in L), (v) checks if the timestamp is in
order (i. e. not too old and not too new), and (vi) forwards the mes-
sage to the environment if everything is in order. If some step fails,
the server simply drops the message.
When the environment wants to reply to a message, the server
first checks if the nonce is valid (i. e. occurs in L), else it sends an er-
ror message to the environment. This is important as the nonce may
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have been removed from L due to capacity reasons without notifica-
tion to the environment. Then, the server initializes its instance of
the signature scheme for this session, signs the message, and writes
it on an external network tape.
Note that during the steps to process a request or a response,
the control may be passed to the adversary by some of the ideal
functionalities the server uses. Hence, the execution of the steps when
processing a request or response may be interrupted by the adversary
(e. g., by sending another incoming message to this server). As soon
as a message is received that is not related to processing the current
message, the processing of the current message is aborted by the
server and cannot be resumed later.
5 Results
Our result states that our protocol securely realizes the ideal func-
tionality F2AM. The formal statement of the theorem is as follows:
Theorem 1.
F2AM ≥BB P2AMEX−1 ≥BB PJS2AMEX−1
where F2AM = !FC | !FS | FNG | !FEI ,
P2AMEX−1 = !PC | !PS | !PSI | !FKS | !FSig | !FLC ,
PJS2AMEX−1 = !PC | !PS | !PSI | !FKS | !PJSSig | !FSig | !FLC .
Before we give the proof of the theorem, we first explain the in-
volved simulation statements. The first of these inequalities states
that the IITM realization of our protocol, when using an ideal sig-
nature functionality, realizes the system consisting of the ideal func-
tionalities for F2AM.
Due to the way in which the ideal signature functionality is used,
the realization of the protocol as stated in the first inequality is un-
realistic, because for each message sent a new key for the signature
scheme is generated. This can be avoided by applying a joint-state
theorem [KT08a] allowing different sessions to use the same key. Es-
sentially, a “wrapper” PJSSig managing different sessions is used to
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access the signature functionalities. The second inequality in Theo-
rem 1 (which follows directly from [KT08b]) makes use of this wrap-
per, so that instead of one key per party and per session (!FSig), there
is only a single key for each party (!FSig), as in a realistic public-key
infrastructure.
Theorem 1 gives a security treatment of a complex protocol in a
simulation-based security setting: Our protocol features a long-lived
server role, uses timestamps to prevent replay attacks, and accesses
a public-key infrastructure for digital signatures. It is easy to see
that long-livedness and timestamps are required to realize our ideal
functionality with bounded memory (see [KSW09]). It is interesting
to note that while our ideal server functionality is short-lived, a
realization necessarily needs to be long-lived; this is a particular
property of authenticated message exchange with only two rounds.
We now prove the theorem. A full formal proof would need to
establish a bisimulation between the system consisting of the real
protocol and that consisting of the ideal protocol and the simulator;
the proof below argues why the key points in a correctness proof of
the bisimulation can be carried out.
Proof. As mentioned above, it suffices to show the first simulation,
as the second one follows directly from [KT08a]. First note that
in the ideal functionality F2AM, we may remove the global nonce
generator FNG and let each client generate the nonce locally—since
the probability of a collision is negligible in the security parameter,
the resulting system is computationally indistinguishable from F2AM.
Hence we only need to show that P2AMEX−1 correctly realizes the
thus-modified F2AM. For the remainder of the proof, when we speak
of F2AM we mean this modified version.
To prove the theorem, we construct a simulator S such that the
systems E | A | S | F2AM and E | A | P2AMEX−1 are computationally
indistinguishable for every adversary A and every environment E .
The main idea of the simulator (which is presented in Appendix C
in detail) is that while interacting with E , A, and all machines that
are active in the ideal functionality F2AM, it simulates every machine
that would be present in a run of the system P2AMEX−1 in such a
way that the environment receives the exact same messages on the
I/O interface from the machines in F2AM as it would receive from
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the machines in P2AMEX−1, and analogously presents network traffic
to A that is identical to the traffic a real instance of P2AMEX−1 would
generate on the same inputs.
The key point of the proof is that in our protocol and ideal func-
tionality is that even in the ideal functionality, the adversary may
completely control whether a message sent by an instance will reach
the environment—hence the simulator essentially consists of book-
keeping and allowing the delivery of messages by the ideal function-
ality as soon as delivery happens in the simulated real functionality.
To show that this simulation indeed works as intended, we argue
that for every sequence of messages sent by A or E , the simulation is
correct in the following sense: The state of each simulated machine
of the protocol P2AMEX−1 (i. e., the client machines, server machines,
signature functionality, signature interface, and key store) is iden-
tical in the simulation and in a hypothetical execution of the real
protocol (with the same inputs). We argue separately for each type
of machine.
Signature functionality FSig. By construction of the simulator,
the signature functionality is simulated exactly as it is. It also fol-
lows from the discussion below of the (simulated) server and client
machines that the simulated signature functionality receives the ex-
act same incoming requests in a real execution of the protocol and
in a simulation. Note that resources obtained from the environment
for PSI are forwarded to the simulated PSI directly.
Server protocol machine PS. By construction, the simulator uses
an adaption of the program of the real protocol machine PS. The ne-
gotiation of the initial parameters of the server is directly forwarded
to the adversary A, hence the obtained parameters are as in a real
execution of the protocol. Note that in a real protocol run, when
the server receives a new message while waiting for a reply of the
key store functionality or for a signature verification, the waiting is
aborted and only the new message is processed—this is mirrored in
the simulation by the instruction to cancel currently running jobs
for a server when it receives a new message.
By design of the simulation, if a network message is rejected by
the server (due to either a false signature, or an outdated times-
tamp), the state of the server is not changed, and no reply of any
kind is sent. Hence in this case the simulated server behaves in the
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same way as in a real execution of the protocol. In the case that a
message is accepted, the list L is maintained as in the real protocol.
Instead of notifying the environment about the delivery of the mes-
sage (as the real protocol implementation would do), the simulator
then instructs the (ideal) client to deliver the message to the (ideal)
server, which leads to the exact same output to the environment as
a delivery to the real server would.
When the environment instructs the (ideal) server to send a reply
to a client, then by design of the ideal server functionality, the server
asks the adversary whether to proceed. Since S receives the corre-
sponding query intended for the adversary, it can check whether in
the simulated real server, the request of the environment could still
be fulfilled (which is the case if and only if a message with the cor-
responding message id is still present in the list L and has not been
marked as answered), and in this case allow the server to proceed.
Note that the simulator simulates the exact same requests made
by a server to the signature functionality, hence the simulated func-
tionality receives the exact same messages as it would in a run of
the real protocol.
Client protocol machine PC. This works in much the same way
as the server machine: The simulator performs the same verification
steps that the real client machine would, and outputs the same data
to the environment. Again, the requests for the simulated signature
functionality and key store are identical in the simulated and in a
real run of the protocol.
Signature interface functionality and key store. As mentioned
above, in both real and simulated protocol runs, the signature inter-
face and key store functionalities perform the exact same requests:
By construction of the simulator, A may communicate directly with
the simulated machines in the same way as it would in a real proto-
col run. Since the simulator uses the code of the ideal functionalities,
this implies that they are in the same state.
Corruption. By design, a running copy of an ideal client or server
functionality is corrupted if and only if a copy of the real server
or client would be in a real protocol run. Note that the simulator
ensures that as soon as a single copy of a (short-lived) ideal server
instance for an identity s is corrupted, then every newly started
ideal server instance for this identity is corrupted immediately by
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the simulator; this mirrors the corresponding behavior in a run of
the real protocol, where each identity only a single server machine
is running. Hence requests of the form Corrupted? issued by E get
answered positively in the simulated protocol run if and only if the
answer would be positive in a real one. Also, the communication with
corrupted parties is handled using the same Corr macro in the same
way in both simulated and real protocol runs, hence the replies of
the relevant parties are identical.
6 Discussion
Simulation-based security clearly has the advantage that it leads
to an easier statement of security than an individual, trace-based
definition, and moreover, allows to treat protocols for very different
tasks in a single model. The security properties obtained by such an
analysis are quite strong and hold (via composition) in an arbitrary
context. The IITM framework (and related frameworks) is designed
to support modular protocol analysis.
However, these advantages come with a price when considering a
concrete complex protocol. In [KSW09], we presented a customized
model (based on the seminal work by Bellare and Rogaway [BR93])
for proving security of 2AMEX-1. A comparison between that work
and the current paper gives insights into the advantages and disad-
vantages of both approaches.
The formulation of both ideal functionalities and concrete imple-
mentations for authenticated message exchange in the current paper
is rather long and unintuitive (the latter are significantly more com-
plex than their counterparts in [KSW09]). Both feature unnatural
communication (bit strings to provide computing resources, status
and activation messages exchanged sent to and received from the
adversary and the environment), which are necessary due to how
resources and activation are handled. Intuitively, one would like the
environment to only access the “service” provided by the function-
alities, but in the IITM framework, the environment additionally
needs to provide resources for the involved parties that allow them
to process the input.
Furthermore, the handling of corruption in the IITM framework
is more complex and seems less natural than in the Bellare-Rogaway
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based model. Also, for the analysis of our protocol, the modular
approach provided by the IITM framework does not simplify the
security analysis, compared to the proof in [KSW09]. Finally, the use
of the joint-state theorem to enable realistic treatment of signatures
results in a slightly different protocol from the one originally stated
in [KSW09] and from a realistic implementation.
It would be very interesting to know whether the IITM frame-
work can be adapted to remove the above-mentioned difficulties.
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A Simulation-Based Security
Simulation-based security allows to analyze cryptographic protocols
such that properties proven remain true even when the protocol is
used as a sub-protocol of a larger system. The main idea is to define
a so-called ideal functionality, which specifies a cryptographic goal
to be realized by a protocol. This ideal functionality also documents
the capabilities of an attacker on the protocol. A concrete protocol is
“secure” if it realizes the ideal functionality such that every attacker
on the real protocol can be “simulated” in the ideal setting. We
briefly sketch Küsters’ model using inexhaustible interactive Turing
machines (IITM’s). For precise definitions and background on these
notions, see [Küs06].
A.1 Inexhaustible Interactive Turing Machines
Cryptographic protocols are modeled as a set of concurrently run-
ning machines, called a system of IITM’s (see below). The machines
in the system are activated sequentially, where at each point in time,
only a single machine is active, and each machine may be activated
repeatedly. A single IITM is a probabilistic Turing machine with an
associated polynomial q used to bound its running time and output
length. In addition to work tapes, an IITM has named external tapes
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which may be shared with other machines running concurrently. Ex-
ternal read-tapes of machines are partitioned into consuming and
enriching tapes. This distinction serves to allow the maximal run-
ning time of the machines to depend on the input on the enriching
tapes, and not merely on the security parameter alone as in stan-
dard cryptographic models as [BR93]. In order to avoid “exponential
blow-up” of lengths of exchanged messages, a well-formed system is
defined to be one where the sub-graph of machines connected with
enriching tapes is acyclic. As proved in [Küs06], a well-formed system
can be simulated on a single polynomial-time machine.
External tapes are partitioned into network tapes and I/O-tapes.
The former are used to model communication with subprocesses
(here an attacker on the system cannot interfere), the latter model
network communication (this is assumed to be controlled by the ad-
versary completely).
An IITM can run in two different modes (determined by the
content of the mode tape upon activation): The CheckAddress mode
is used to determine whether an incoming message is intended for
the current machine. When activated in this mode, the IITM reads
an input message from a special input tape and returns accept or
reject on a special output tape. In this mode, computation may not
be probabilistic, and the number of steps taken must be bounded
by q(n), where q is the polynomial associated with the machine, and
n is the length of the content of the work tapes, the current input,
and the security parameter. This mode is typically used to verify
whether an incoming message belongs to the correct session. The
Compute mode is then used for the actual computation (which may
include replying to the incoming message). The number of steps in
this mode must be bounded by q(n), where q and n are as in mode
CheckAddress. Additionally, the total output up to a point in the run
of the machine, as well as the length of all work tapes must always
be bounded by q(m), where m is the sum of the security parameter
plus the length of all input received on enriching input tapes in mode
Compute in the current run of the system. This implies that when a
machine is required to produce “long” output, it previously must be
given the corresponding resources via enriching input tapes.
In each activation, a machine produces output on at most one
output tape, the machine that has the corresponding tape as an
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input tape is then activated next. If no output is produced, the
environmental machine is activated (see below).
A.2 System of IITM’s for Cryptographic Protocols
A system of IITM’s is an expression of the form
P = M1 ‖ . . . ‖ Mk ‖ !M ′1 ‖ . . . ‖ !M ′k , (3)
where the Mi and M
′
i are IITM’s. The machines M
′
1, . . . ,M
′
k are said
to appear in the scope of a bang : The bang operator “!” provides
an “infinite supply” of machines (running the code of) M ′i . In a
run of a system, this is handled as follows: When a machine M
sends a message (via a shared tape) to a machine M ′ of which a
copy is already running, but this copy rejects the message in its
CheckAddress mode and M ′ appears in the scope of a bang, then a
new instance of M ′ is started, which then may accept the message
in CheckAddress mode. If it does, it remains active and processes the
incoming message. Otherwise it is deactivated again. This allows to
start an unbounded number of sessions of a protocol.
An external tape of a system P is a tape which is a network- or
I/O-tape of one of its machines for which there is no corresponding
output or input tape in the system itself. These tapes allow external
machines to communicate with P , and thus enable P to provide
a functionality to “outside” machines. This mechanism allows to
naturally compose systems of IITM’s in a way allowing interaction:
For two systems P1 and P2, P1 | P2 denotes the system containing
all machines of P1 and P2, where internal tapes of the systems are
consistently renamed (the systems only influence each other via their
communication on their external tapes).
To define security notions for cryptographic protocols, the com-
position of a given system with an environment and an adversary
are studied. An adversary for P is a system A such that the set
of external I/O-tapes of P and A are disjoint, and for every exter-
nal output network tape of P , there is an external network input
tape of A, and vice versa. This means that an adversary for P is
syntactically suited to connect to all external “network ports” of P .
Typically, all incoming external tapes of an adversary are defined
to be enriching. An environmental system for P similarly connects
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Fig. 6. An abstract view of the two systems of IITM’s
to the I/O-tapes, and its set of external network tapes is disjoint
with that of P . When P and Fare systems (the real and the ideal
system), then an adversarially connectable system S is a simulator
for Fand P , if S | F has the exact same set of external tapes (with
matching type and direction) as P (note that an output (input) tape
in S | F is only external when there is no input (output) tape with
the same name in S or in F . Hence a simulator only connects to the
network tapes of F , and syntactically, S | F and P “look the same”.
In particular, a system E is a suitable environment for P if and only
if it is one for S | F .
A system may have a special external output tape named deci-
sion. When a machine writes output to this tape (the output must
be either 0 or 1), the run of the system stops immediately. Two
systems are equivalent, if the probability that for the same input, a
different value is written on the decision tape, is negligible (in the
security parameter). This means that for an outside observer that
may only interact with the systems using their I/O-interface, the
systems behave identically with overwhelming probability.
We now define the central security notion that we study, also
see Figure 6—in the following, F is supposed to be an “ideal” sys-
tem (also called ideal functionality, and P a concrete system that
attempts to “realize” the ideal functionality. P and F are I/O-
compatible if they have disjoint sets of external network tapes, the
same set of external I/O-tapes, and each external I/O-tape has the
same direction in both.
Definition 2. Let P and F be I/O-compatible systems. Then P ≤BB
F .if there is a simulator S for P and F such that for all adversaries
25
A and environments E for P or S | F , the systems E | P and
E | S | F are equivalent.
Here “equivalent” means that with overwhelming probability,
the same input leads to the same output. This models the intu-
ition expressed above: The simulator S essentially makes the system
Fbehave exactly as P (without the simulator). Hence any attack
that can be mounted on the real protocol system P is also successful
against the ideal functionality F .
A.3 Session Versions of IITM’s
The IITM model offers a simple mechanism for specifying multi-
session variants of a protocol: For an IITM M , the machine M sim-
ulates M , and expects that all incoming messages are prefixed with
a session-id. This session-id is then removed from the string actually
handed to the simulated M , and is added as a prefix to every mes-
sage written by the simulated M on an output tape. Hence a system
of the form !M has an unlimited supply of machines executing the
code of M , each using an independent session. Multi-party, multi-
session variants of a protocol, are then obtained by using M : These
machines handle prefixes containing a party- and a session-id.
B Functionalities and Protocols
B.1 Notation
When defining an IITM M , we describe it in the following way:
First, we define the tapes of M . We denote by A↔ B a tape or
a pair of tapes in the following way:
– the label on the left-hand side (e. g., A) is the name of the tape
on M ’s side of the tape, whereas the label on the right-hand
side (e. g., B) is the name of the tape on the machine that M is
connected to,
– a single output tape is denoted by −→, a single input tape is
denoted by ←−, and a pair of input and output tapes is denoted
by ←→,
– a consuming tape is denoted by −→, an enriching tape by −,
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– an I/O tape is denoted by −→, a network tape by 99K.
Next, we may define an initialization routine which is executed
when the IITM is activated for the first time.
In the main part, we describe a couple of steps: We assume that
the machine matches each incoming message against a couple of
patterns, executing the first step that has a matching pattern, and
discarding the message if no step matches. During the execution of a
single step, if the machine waits for a specific message, it will ignore
all other incoming messages, even if they would match any of the
patterns of the steps.
For the simulator we also define functions or subroutines.
In some functionalities we then include the parameterized cor-
ruption macro, see below. This adds a couple of steps which take
precedence over the steps we defined above.
Last, for most functionalities we describe the IITM’s operation
in CheckAddress mode, where the default mode is to accept all in-
coming messages.
B.2 Message Format
Due to the addressing mechanism used in the IITM model, a message
that is being sent to a banged IITM has to contain information
allowing all currently running instances to decide which of them is
supposed to accept that message.
Thus, our messages have the format (pid , sid , ...) where pid is a
party id and sid is a session id. The party id is used to identify a
client or a server, usually the sender of the message or, in case the
message comes from the environment or the adversary, the recipient
of this message. The session id usually consists of three parts: (i) a
constant, either Client or Server, to distinguish the role of the party,
(ii) the identity of the communication partner, and (iii) the nonce
used in this session.
Note that in our case it is not possible to use the identifier version
as defined in [KT08a] because of two reasons: Firstly, when initial-
izing a new instance, at least the nonce is not yet known by the
initializing party (i. e., the environment). Secondly, the parties have
to communicate with different pids and sids than their own, i. e.,
while communicating with server s and using nonce r, a client c has
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to access both the key with pid c and sid (Client, s, r) for signing as
well as the key with pid s and sid (Server, c, r) for verifying.
B.3 Corruption
Both in the ideal functionality F2AM and in the implementation
P2AMEX−1 we model corruption by using the corruption macro
from [KT08a] in a slightly modified variant, in which we add param-
eters for an addressing mechanism. The modified macro is defined
in Appendix B.10.
Using the corruption macro we allow the adversary to corrupt our
clients and servers, while the environment can check the corruption
status of each instance and provide resources for corrupted machines.
Once corrupted, clients and servers abort their normal execution and
only forward messages from and to the adversary as defined in the
macro.
While the adversary can corrupt single client instances, the situa-
tion on the server side is different: If the adversary sends a corruption
request to one instance of FS running under identity s, this instance
will accept all messages which are directed to any instance running
under identity s. This reflects that in the implementation P2AMEX−1
only one (long-lived) instance of PS is running per identity.
Note that the signature and verification functionality FSig used in
P2AMEX−1 also allows corruption. But if the adversary would corrupt,
e. g., a verification instance, it would have no advantage against our
protocol as long as it does not also corrupt the server or client using
that particular instance of the verifier. In addition, in P2AMEX−1
the environment would have to pass resources to that verification
instance, while in F2AM no signature scheme is available to receive
the resources—but adding a mechanism to F2AM which receives the
resources and passes them on to the simulator would result in a
rather unnatural ideal functionality.
Therefore, even though we technically allow the adversary to cor-
rupt instances of the signature scheme (or its verifiers) in P2AMEX−1,
we make it rather useless: Before PC and PS use any signature or
verification functionality, they check the functionalities’ corruption
status and abort if it is corrupted. Note that the adversary may still
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get complete control over the input and output of a client or server
by simply corrupting that client or server instance.
B.4 The Nonce Generator Functionality FNG
Tapes: NG←←→ C
Initialization: L = [ ]
Steps: loop
Generate a fresh nonce:
if (pid , sid ,GetNonce) = m received from C
Generate an η-bit nonce r randomly with r /∈ L, as long as |L| ≤ 2η ,
where η is the security parameter.
Insert r in L.
Send (pid , sid ,Nonce, r) to C.
B.5 The Enriching Input Functionality FEI
Tapes: EI EEI, EI L999K ÂEI
Steps: loop
Forward resources:
if (Resources, 1n, b) received from EEI
Send (Resources, b, n) to ÂEI.
B.6 The Server Protocol PS
Tapes: S←←→ ES, S L999K AS, S←→→ KS, S←→→ LC, Ssig ←→→ Sig, Sver ←→→ Sig
Initialization: s = caps = tol
+
s = mc = σc = kc = ε, R = L = [ ], ts = t
min = 0,
state = Init, cor = false
Steps: loop
Initialize a new buffer:
if (s′, (Server), Init, 1n) received from ES
If state = Init,
Send (s′, (Server),GetParameters) to AS.
Recv (s′, (Server),Parameters, cap, tol+) from AS.
Let s = s′. If cap ≤ 0 or tol+ ≤ 0, abort.
Send (s, (Server, c, r),GetTime) to LC.
Recv (s, (Server, c, r),Time, t) from LC.
Let state = OK, caps = cap, tol
+
s = tol
+, ts = t, tmin = ts + tol
+
s .
Append n to R.
Receive and process a request: Request the client’s key:
if (m,σ) received from AS with m = (From : c,To : s,MsgID : r,Time : t,Body : pc)
If state = Init or R is empty or cor , abort.
Let n be the first item of R. If |pc| > n, abort. Remove n from R.
Let state = WaitingForKeyc, mc = m, and σc = σ.
Send (c, (Client, s, r),GetKey) to KS.
Receive and process a request: Receive the key, request time:
if (c, (Client, s, r),PublicKey, k) received from KS
If state 6= WaitingForKeyc or cor , abort. Let state = WaitingForTime and kc = k.
Send (s, (Server, c, r),GetTime) to LC.
Receive and process a request: Receive time, initialize the verifier:
if (s, (Server, c, r),Time, t) received from LC
If state 6= WaitingForTime or cor , abort.
If t ≥ ts, let ts = t. Let state = WaitingForVerifier.
Send (c, (Client, s, r), Server, Init) on Sver.
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Receive and process a request: Execute 2AMEX-1 protocol steps, relay request:
if (c, (Client, s, r),Server, Init) received on Sver
If state 6= WaitingForVerifier or cor , abort. Let state = OK.
Send (c, (Client, s, r), Server,Corrupted?) to KS.
Recv (c, (Client, s, r), Server,Corrupted, cor ′) from KS. If cor ′, abort.
Send (c, (Client, s, r), Server,Verify,mc, σc, kc) on Sver.
Recv (c, (Client, s, r), Server,Verified, b) on Sver.
If b 6= 1, t ≤ tmin or t > ts + tol+s , or (t′, r, c′) ∈ L for some t′, c′, abort.
While |L| ≥ caps:
Let tmin = min{t′ | (t′, r′, c′) ∈ L} and L = {(t′, r′, c′) ∈ L | t′ > tmin}.
Insert (t, r, c) into L and send (s, (Server, c, r),Request, pc) to ES.
Receive and process a response: Receive response payload, request key:
if (s, (Server, c, r),Response, ps) received from ES
If state = Init or cor , abort.
If (t′, r, c) /∈ L for any t′:
Let state = OK, send (s, (Server, c, r),Response,Error) to ES, and abort.
Let state = WaitingForKeys and send (s, (Server, c, r),GetKey) to KS.
Receive and process a response: Construct, sign, and send response message:
if (s, (Server, c, r),PublicKey, k) received from KS
If state 6= WaitingForKeys or cor , abort. Let state = OK.
Send (s, (Server, c, r),Corrupted?) to KS.
Recv (s, (Server, c, r),Corrupted, cor) from KS. If cor ′, abort.
Let ms = (From : c,To : s,Ref : r,Body : ps).
Send (s, (Server, c, r), Sign,ms) on Ssig.
Recv (s, (Server, c, r), Signature, σs) on Ssig.
Update (t, r, c) to (t, r, ∗) in L and send (ms, σs) to AS.
Reset the server:
if (s,Reset) received from AS
If state = Init or cor , abort.
Send (s,Server,GetTime) to LC.
Recv (s, Server,Time, t) from LC.
If t ≥ ts, let ts = t.
Let tmin = ts + tol
+
s , R = L = [ ], and state = OK.
Corruption: Corr(cor , true, state 6= Init, ε, AS, {ES}, ES, s)
CheckAddress: Check for s as soon as it has been set.
B.7 The Signature Interface Protocol PSI
Tapes: SI EEI, SI L999K ASI, SI←→→ KS, SIsig ←→→ Sig, SIver ←→→ Sig
Initialization: state = Init, res = 0, k = ε
Steps: loop
Get resources from the environment to sign messages:
if (Resources, 1n) received from EEI
Let res = res + n,
If state = Init0, let state = Init1.
Initialization—initialize the key and the verification functionality:
if (Init) received from ASI
If state 6= Init1, abort.
Send (SI,GetKey) to KS.
Receive (SI,PublicKey, k′) from KS.
Let k = k′.
Send (SI, Init) on SIver.
Receive (SI, Init) on SIver.
Let state = OK.
Send (PublicKey, k) to ASI.
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Sign a message:
if (Sign,m) received from ASI
If state 6= OK, abort.
If m ∈ X, abort.
If |m| > res, abort.
Let res = res − |m|.
Send (Sign,m) on SIsig.
Receive (Signature, σ) on SIsig.
Send (Signature, σ) to ASI.
Verify a message:
if (Verify,m, σ) received from ASI
If state 6= OK, abort.
If |m| > res, abort.
Let res = res − |m|.
Send (SI,Verify,m, σ, k) on SIver.
Receive (SI,Verified, b) on SIver.
Send (Verified, b) to ASI.
B.8 The Key Store Functionality FKS
Tapes: KS←←→ SI, KS←←→ C, KS←←→ S, KS L999K AKS, KSsig ←→→ Sig, KSver ←→→ Sig,
Esig ←→→ Sig, Ever ←→→ Sig
Initialization: k = ε, LToDo = [ ]
Steps: loop
Request to get the key:
if (GetKey) received from T ∈ {C, S, SI}
Insert T into LToDo.
Send (GetKey, T ) to AKS.
Execute request to get the key:
if (GetKey, T ) received from AKS
If T /∈ LToDo, abort.
If k = ∗, send (Init) on KSsig and stop.
Delete T from LToDo.
Send (PublicKey, k) to T .
Store a generated key and notify the adversary:
if (PublicKey, k′) received on KSsig
Let k = k′.
Send (PublicKey, k) to AKS.
Is the signature functionality corrupted?
if (Corrupted?) received from T ∈ {C, S, SI}
Send (Corrupted?) on Esig.
Receive (x) on Esig.
Send (Corrupted, x) to T .
Is the verification functionality corrupted?
if (id,Corrupted?) received from T ∈ {C, S, SI}
Send (id,Corrupted?) on Ever.
Receive (id, x) on Ever.
Send (id,Corrupted, x) to T .
B.9 The Local Clock Functionality FLC
Tapes: LC←←→ C, LC←←→ S, LC L999K ALC
Steps: loop
Forward resources:
if (GetTime) received from T ∈ {C, S}
Send (GetTime) to ALC.
Recv (Time, t) from ALC.
Send (Time, t) to T .
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B.10 The Modified Corruption Macro Corr
The following corruption macro is a modified version of the one de-
fined in [KT08a]; we added a simple addressing mechanism.
Macro Corr(corrupted ∈ {true, false}, corruptible ∈ {true, false}, initialized ∈ {true, false},
corrMsg, Tadv, Tuser, Tenv, id1, . . . , idn)
Initialization: res = 0
Steps: loop
Corruption Request:
if (id1, ..., idn,Corrupted?) received from Tenv
If intialized, send (corrupted) to Tenv.
Corruption:
if (id1, ..., idn,Corrupt) received from Tadv
If corruptible, initalized, and not corrupted:
Let corrupted = true.
Send (id1, ..., idn,Corrupted, corrMsg) to Tadv.
Forward to A (this rule takes precedence over all other rules):
if (id1, ..., idn, ...) = m received from T ∈ Tuser and corrupted
Let res = 0 and send (id1, ..., idn,Recv,m, T ) to Tadv.
Forward to user:
if (id1, ..., idn, Send,m, T ) received from Tadv, T ∈ Tuser, corrupted, 0 < |m| ≤ res, and
m = (id1, ..., idn, ...)
Send m to T .
Ressources:
if (id1, ..., idn,Resources, r) received from Tenv and corrupted
Let res = |r| and send (id1, ..., idn,Resources, r) to Tadv.
CheckAddress: Check for id1, ..., idn.
C Simulator
Tapes: SI L99L 99K ASI, C L99L 99K AC, KS L99L 99K AKS, LC L99L 99K ALC, sig L99L 99K Asig,
ver L99L 99K Aver, S L99L 99K AS, ÂEI L999K EI, ÂC L999K C, ÂS L999K S
Initialization: c = s = r = ε, n = 0, state = Init, cor = false
Steps: loop
Initialization of the server:
if (s, (Server), Init, n) received from S
If state[s] 6= Init,
Run processServerInit(s, n) concurrently.
Receive a request from the client:
if (c, (Client, s, r),Request, pc, n) received from C
Run processClientSend(c, s, r, pc, n) concurrently.
Deliver a request to the server:
if (mc, σc) received from AS with mc = (From : c,To : s,MsgID : r,Time : tc,Body : pc)
Cancel any concurrent runs of processServerReceive or processServerSend with
server identity s.
Run processServerReceive(mc, σc) concurrently.
Receive response from the server:
if (s, (Server, c, r),Response, ps) received from S
Cancel any concurrent runs of processServerReceive or processServerSend with
server identity s.
Run processServerSend(s, c, r, ps) concurrently.
Deliver a response to the client:
if (ms, σs) received from AC with ms = (From : s,To : c,Ref : r,Body : ps)
Run processClientReceive(ms, σs) concurrently.
32
Reset the server:
if (s,Reset) received from AS




if (id1, ..., idn,Corrupt) received from AC, AS, Asig, or Aver
processCorruptionRequest(id1, ..., idn, T ).
Corrupted forward to the adversary:
if (id1, ..., idn,Recv,m, T ) received from C or S
Send (id1, ..., idn,Recv,m, T ) to AC or AS.
Corrupted forward to the user:
if (id1, ..., idn, Send,m, T ) received from AC or AS
Send (id1, ..., idn,Send,m, T ) to C or S.
Ressources for Signing:
if (pid, sid,Resources, 1n) received from EI
Send (pid, sid,Resources, 1n) to SI.
In addition, simulate !FSig | !PSI | !FKS | !FLC and answer internal requests as well as
request from the adversary to these machines.
Functions:
Initialization of the server:
processServerInit(s, n)
If state[s] = ε,
Send (s, (Server),GetParameters) to AS.
Recv (s, (Server),Parameters, cap, tol+) from AS.
If cap ≤ 0 or tol+ ≤ 0, abort.
Let t = getTime(s, (Server, c, r)).
Let state[s] = OK, cap[s] = cap, and tol+[s] = tol+.
Let t[s] = t, tmin[s] = t[s] + tol+[s], and R[s] = L[s] = [ ].
Let state[s] = Init.
Append n to R[s].
If cor [Server, s],
corruptServer(s)
Let state[s] = OK.
Send (s, (Server), Init,OK) to S.
Receive a request from the client:
processClientSend(c, s, r, pc, n)
Let state[c, s, r] = OK and n[c, s, r] = n.
Let k = getKey(c, (Client, s, r)).
Let t = getTime(c, (Client, s, r)).
Let mc = (From : c,To : s,MsgID : r,Time : t,Body : pc).
Let σc = sign(c, (Client, s, r),mc).
Send (mc, σc) to AC.
Deliver a request to the server:
processServerReceive(mc, σc)
Decode mc into (From : c,To : s,MsgID : r,Time : tc,Body : pc).
If state[s] 6= OK, cor [Server, s], or R[s] is empty, abort.
Let n be the first item of R[s]. If |pc| > n, abort. Remove n from R[s].
Let k = getKey(c, (Client, s, r)).
Let t′ = getTime(s, (Server, c, r)).
If t′ ≥ t[s], let t[s] = t′.
Let b = verify(c, (Client, s, r), Server,mc, σc, k).
If b 6= 1, tc ≤ tmin[s] or tc > t[s] + tol+s , or (t′, r, c′) ∈ L[s] for some t′, c′, abort.
While |L[s]| ≥ caps:
Let tmin[s] = min{t′ | (t′, r′, c′) ∈ L[s]}.
Let L[s] = {(t′, r′, c′) ∈ L[s] | t′ > tmin[s]}.
Insert (t, r, c) into L[s].
Send (c, (Client, s, r),Request, Send) to C.
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Receive response from the server:
processServerSend(s, c, r, ps)
If state[s] 6= OK, abort.
If (t′, r, c) /∈ L[s] for any t′,
Send (s, (Server, c, r),Response,Error) to S and abort.
Let k = getKey(s, (Server, c, r)).
Let ms = (From : c,To : s,Ref : r,Body : ps).
Let σs = sign(s, (Server, c, r),ms).
Update (t, r, c) to (t, r, ε) in L[s].
Send (ms, σs) to AS.
Deliver a response to the client:
processClientReceive(ms, σs)
Decode ms into (From : c,To : s,Ref : r,Body : ps).
If state[c, s, r] 6= OK, cor [Client, c, (Client, s, r)], or |ps| > n[c, s, r], abort.
Let n[c, s, r] = n[c, s, r]− |ps|, abort.
Let k = getKey(s, (Server, c, r)).
Let b = verify(s, (Server, c, r), Server,ms, σs, k).
If b 6= 1, abort.
Let state[c, s, r] = Stopped.
Send (s, (Server, c, r),Response, Send) to S.
Reset of the server:
processServerReset(s)
If state[s] 6= OK or cor , abort.
Let state[s] = Reset.
Let t = getTime(s, Server).
If t ≥ t[s], let t[s] = t.
Let state[s] = OK, tmin[s] = t[s] + tol+[s] and R[s] = L[s] = [ ].
Corrupt a machine and if necessary, note which one was corrupted:
processCorruptionRequest(id1, ..., idn, T )
If T = AS, let cor [Server, id1] = true.
If T = AC, let cor [Client, id1, id2] = true.
If T = Asig, let cor [Sig, id1, id2] = true.
If T = Aver, let cor [Sig, id1, id2, id3] = true.
Send (id1, ..., idn,Corrupt) to C, S, or Sig.
Corrupt a Server:
corruptServer(pid)
Let cor [Server, s] = true.
Send (pid, (Server),Corrupt) to S
Receive (pid, (Server),Corrupted, x) from S.
Get the time of a principal:
getTime(pid, sid)
Send (pid, sid,GetTime) to LC.
Recv (pid, sid,Time, t) from LC.
Return t.
Get a key from the keystore:
getKey(pid, sid)
Send (pid, sid,GetKey) to KS.




If cor [Sig, pid, sid], abort.
Send (pid, sid, Sign,m) to Sig.




verify(pid, sid, ssid,m, σ, k)
Send (pid, sid, ssid, Init) to Sig.
Recv (pid, sid, ssid, Init) from Sig.
If cor [Sig, pid, sid, ssid], abort.
Send (pid, sid, ssid,Verify,m, σ, k) to Sig.
Recv (pid, sid, ssid,Verified, b) from Sig.
Return b.
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